In the context of a dynamic game-theoretic analysis we investigate the conditions under which firm-level unions may strategically collude, or not, and the impact of their decisions upon the firms’ incentives to individually spend on R&D investments.
This paper investigates unionized oligopolistic markets with differentiated products and quality improvement-R&D investments.
In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of product market competition by exploring its strategic role on firms' incentives for collusion.
In a union-oligopoly static framework we study the role of unions regarding the possibility and the effects of endogenous cartel formation.
In a unionized Cournot duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining regime, we analyzed undeclared labour in a matrix game. We reveal the opportunity cost between taxation and contributions for social insurance that firms and unions face, while we examine all relevant possible unilateral deviations from firms and unions.
Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O framework. In a unionized duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining context, we reveal the opportunity cost that exists between the taxation and the contributions for social insurance.
In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market
This letter proposes a simple test for the linearity of a time series. We compare the small and large samples properties of the suggested test via Monte Carlo techniques with well known time domain linearity tests. Our results suggest that the suggested test over performs the power of the other competitive tests in small samples.
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