In the present paper we develop a two-period unionized mixed duopoly model, furnished with second period- demand shocks, where decentralized firm-specific wage bargains are struck in each period before product market competition is in place.
Our study explores how emerging country firms can utilize cooperative agreements with advanced country firms to adjust to the new environment, and uncovers the conditions under which cooperation becomes preferable to competitive rivalry for both parties
This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adop- tion. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the downstream firms can adopt later a new technology when the upstream bargaining power increases as well as when wholesale price contracts, instead of two-part tariffs, are employed.
We investigate the market and societal effects of a socially responsible multinational enterprise’s entry in a host market through exports and through FDI, the determinants of the multinational’s decision between exports and FDI, as well as the respective host country’s policies. We find that the multinational enterprise, seeking for a competitive advantage in the host market, strategically engages in CSR activities and meets the corresponding demand by socially conscious consumers.
In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of product market competition by exploring its strategic role on firms' incentives for collusion.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market
The present paper compares the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes and social welfare in vertically related markets with upstream monopolistic market structure, where the trade between the upstream monopolist and the downstream firms is conducted via two-part tariffs contracts.
The present paper investigates the firms' incentives to invest in comparative advertising in a spatially differentiated duopoly market characterized by network externalities.
The present paper examines endogenously the firms' incentives to invest in informative and comparative advertising, in an oligopolistic market with horizontally differentiated products where competition take place in quantities.
We study the endogenous formation of upstream R&D networks in a vertically related industry. We find that, when upstream firms set prices, the complete network that includes all firms emerges in equilibrium.
We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms' incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications.
Under competing vertical chains, we propose that the downstream mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the outcome of independent implicit agreements, between each downstream firm and its exclusive input supplier, in each vertical chain.
We study competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain over their form and terms of trading.
In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms’ owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare.
The European labour markets are characterized by the existence of trade unions with extensive coverage whereas wage contracts are typically determined through decentralized firm-union bargaining. On the other hand, as it particularly refers to migrant and ethnic minority groups, equally-skilled workers often face lower reservation wages. We argue that these facts may lead unions to opt for discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees.
We examine how the strategic long-run decisions, such as cost-reducing R&D invest- ments, prior to the decision for integration; create endogenous efficiency gains that make a horizontal integration profitable.
The present paper explores the scope of strategic delegation, to the firms' R&D investments and market competition in a Cournot Oligopoly.
The present paper examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement the provision of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by private firms in an oligopolistic market.
We investigate for the individual and relative accuracy of two major market power tests: the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), and the merger simulation model of unilateral effects. We propose a methodology to compare the predictive and screening power of both tests by implementing them in a hypothetical economy.
This paper studies firms owners' incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market, in a strategic delegation and vertical product differentiation context.
In this paper a broad list of different merger motives that has been proposed in the literature are analyzed and compared.
This paper investigates the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to spend on cost-reducing R&D activities as well as to form a Research Joint Venture, in the presence of R&D spillovers.
This paper studies the endogenous structure of incentive contracts that firms' owners offer to their managers, when these contracts are linear combinations either of own profits and own revenues, or of own profits and competitor's profits or, finally, of own profits and own market share.
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