We study firms’ incentives to offer profit-sharing schemes in a unionized differentiated goods duopoly in which firms bargain with a sector-wide union or firm-specific unions over the selected remuneration schemes.
This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adop- tion. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the downstream firms can adopt later a new technology when the upstream bargaining power increases as well as when wholesale price contracts, instead of two-part tariffs, are employed.
We investigate the market and societal effects of a socially responsible multinational enterprise’s entry in a host market through exports and through FDI, the determinants of the multinational’s decision between exports and FDI, as well as the respective host country’s policies. We find that the multinational enterprise, seeking for a competitive advantage in the host market, strategically engages in CSR activities and meets the corresponding demand by socially conscious consumers.
The present paper examines the firms' incentives to adopt a new cost reducing technology in vertically related markets, as well as, the effects of the vertical relations on the firms' timing of adoption.
The present paper compares the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium outcomes and social welfare in vertically related markets with upstream monopolistic market structure, where the trade between the upstream monopolist and the downstream firms is conducted via two-part tariffs contracts.
The present paper investigates the firms' incentives to invest in comparative advertising in a spatially differentiated duopoly market characterized by network externalities.
The present paper examines endogenously the firms' incentives to invest in informative and comparative advertising, in an oligopolistic market with horizontally differentiated products where competition take place in quantities.
We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms' incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications.
We study competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain over their form and terms of trading.
In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms’ owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare.
We examine how the strategic long-run decisions, such as cost-reducing R&D invest- ments, prior to the decision for integration; create endogenous efficiency gains that make a horizontal integration profitable.
The present paper explores the scope of strategic delegation, to the firms' R&D investments and market competition in a Cournot Oligopoly.
The present paper examines the conditions under which the regulator can complement the provision of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities by private firms in an oligopolistic market.
We study the endogenous emergence of incentive contracts used by firm owners to delegate the strategic decisions of the firm
This paper studies firms owners' incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market, in a strategic delegation and vertical product differentiation context.
This paper investigates the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to spend on cost-reducing R&D activities as well as to form a Research Joint Venture, in the presence of R&D spillovers.
This paper studies the endogenous structure of incentive contracts that firms' owners offer to their managers, when these contracts are linear combinations either of own profits and own revenues, or of own profits and competitor's profits or, finally, of own profits and own market share.
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