Pesticide use generates dynamic externalities through resistance, health, and environmental channels, complicating the design of optimal regulation. We develop a dynamic framework in which pesticide use, resistance, and damages are jointly determined under a balanced-budget constraint. Resistance affects policy through two margins: it raises marginal external damages by amplifying effective exposure, but also reduces pesticide use, shrinking the fiscal base for intervention. This interaction creates a state-dependent gap between the Pigouvian benchmark and the constrained-efficient policy, which we term fiscal attenuation. We characterize the optimal tax-subsidy system and show that resistance both strengthens the case for taxation and shifts implementation toward non-chemical control. Simulations quantify the nonlinear interaction between resistance dynamics and fiscal capacity, highlighting the joint role of evolving damages and fiscal constraints in optimal environmental poli
We measure performance on the basis of a publishing productivity index which allows to account for difference in research inputs among departments.
Based on an endogenous growth model, we extent Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1993) theoretical framework to analyse empirically the relationship between economic growth, announced tax rate and tax monitoring expenses using data from 32 OECD countries during the 1999-2007 period.
This paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the two main policy instruments affecting evasion rates, namely, the announced tax rate and the share of tax revenues allocated to tax monitoring mechanisms.
In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital.
In this paper drawing from the theoretical framework developed by Shieh et al., (2002), we present an endogenous growth model to empirical analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public capital among military spending and investment in infrastructure.
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