Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Wednesday, 17 March 2021, 15:00-16:15

Room: Zoom

Presenter: Marini Marco, Sapienza Università di Roma

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, this stability concept predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. The Myopic Stable Set thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It furthermore provides a behavioral rationale for real-world economic phenomena such as Edgeworth-like price cycles, price dispersion and supply shortages.

Zoom link (copy and paste to your browser): https://zoom.us/j/98193710479?pwd=V1hhZmNtRjlxaUNTdGFvRHArbi9idz09 

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