In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market
In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market.
Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O framework. In a unionized duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining context, we reveal the opportunity cost that exists between the taxation and the contributions for social insurance.
In a unionized Cournot duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining regime, we analyzed undeclared labour in a matrix game. We reveal the opportunity cost between taxation and contributions for social insurance that firms and unions face, while we examine all relevant possible unilateral deviations from firms and unions.
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