We investigate the market and societal effects of a socially responsible multinational enterprise’s entry in a host market through exports and through FDI, the determinants of the multinational’s decision between exports and FDI, as well as the respective host country’s policies. We find that the multinational enterprise, seeking for a competitive advantage in the host market, strategically engages in CSR activities and meets the corresponding demand by socially conscious consumers.
The present paper studies the relative efficiency between hotels operating under a brand and hotels operating independently, in the island of Crete, Greece, using the Data Envelopment Analysis.
We study the endogenous formation of upstream R&D networks in a vertically related industry. We find that, when upstream firms set prices, the complete network that includes all firms emerges in equilibrium.
We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on firms' incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative market and societal implications.
Under competing vertical chains, we propose that the downstream mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the outcome of independent implicit agreements, between each downstream firm and its exclusive input supplier, in each vertical chain.
In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms’ owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare.
We examine how the strategic long-run decisions, such as cost-reducing R&D invest- ments, prior to the decision for integration; create endogenous efficiency gains that make a horizontal integration profitable.
We study the endogenous emergence of incentive contracts used by firm owners to delegate the strategic decisions of the firm
This paper studies firms owners' incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market, in a strategic delegation and vertical product differentiation context.
This paper investigates the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to spend on cost-reducing R&D activities as well as to form a Research Joint Venture, in the presence of R&D spillovers.
This paper studies the endogenous structure of incentive contracts that firms' owners offer to their managers, when these contracts are linear combinations either of own profits and own revenues, or of own profits and competitor's profits or, finally, of own profits and own market share.
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