Delegation and Worker Training

Delegation and Worker Training

Wednesday, 08 March 2017, 12:00-13:30

Room: Α2-2

Presenter: Bilanakos Christos, Athens University of Economics and Business

This paper models a principal-firm offering training to its agent-worker under alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker's preferred investment project. We identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit-maximizing training intensity. Empirical estimates from matched employer-employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed effect estimates and across many robustness checks including an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects.

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