The alliance governance literature has often stressed the importance of the board of directors as a mechanism of administrative control for international joint ventures (IJVs). However, there are important issues regarding the control function of the IJV board that are still not fully understood, such as the conditions in which IJV boards engage in more or less monitoring, and how these relationships are contingent upon the composition of the board. In this study we bring together corporate governance and alliance governance research in order to investigate monitoring by IJV boards, and particularly the conditions that affect the engagement of different types of IJV directors in monitoring. Based on a sample of 105 IJVs, we argue and show that the monitoring role played by different types of directors depends on the extent to which parent companies compete in similar end-markets and the degree of their cultural differences. Our findings provide direct evidence on the ability of boards with different composition to undertake monitoring in different collaborative contexts.
Zoom link: https://zoom.us/j/97374751400?pwd=UjZ4cUVaSXZ2bnZUT1BNSVhySFlDQT09
