Financial institutions and firms operate in environments where their decisions are interlinked: the financial position of one institution may depend on the actions of others. The presentation focuses on studying this interdependence in financial credit networks, with emphasis on the role of individual incentives and strategic behavior in shaping equilibria and overall economic welfare. The starting point is the connection between economic decision-making and game theory, as strategic interaction arises when the decisions of one firm affect the outcomes of others. At the same time, the computational dimension raises the question of whether the equilibria resulting from strategic behavior can be effectively identified and analyzed in complex financial networks. A central example is prepayments in financial credit networks. The analysis considers both the case of centralized coordination, where firms' decisions are selected with the aim of maximizing overall welfare, and the decentralized case, where each firm seeks to maximize its individual utility. To this end, Nash equilibria and their efficiency are studied. Studies on debt-maturity extensions and asset liquidations by financial institutions are situated within the same research framework. Overall, these studies form a research direction at the interface of economic theory, game theory, and computational methods, focusing on strategic behavior and its implications for the efficiency and welfare of interdependent financial systems.
Zoom: https://uoc-gr.zoom.us/j/88177475079?pwd=ik9vJRdyknP8xneS5NumlqgQdnplaz.1
