In the present paper we develop a two-period unionized mixed duopoly model, furnished with second period- demand shocks, where decentralized firm-specific wage bargains are struck in each period before product market competition is in place.
In a union-oligopoly static framework we study the role of unions regarding the possibility and the effects of endogenous cartel formation.
In a union-oligopoly framework with differentiated products, this paper endogenizes the mode of product market competition by exploring its strategic role on firms' incentives for collusion.
This paper investigates unionized oligopolistic markets with differentiated products and quality improvement-R&D investments.
In the context of a dynamic game-theoretic analysis we investigate the conditions under which firm-level unions may strategically collude, or not, and the impact of their decisions upon the firms’ incentives to individually spend on R&D investments.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market
In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security.
In a union-oligopoly context, we interpret the optimal equilibria may arise from the implementation of any possible policies of a benevolent social planner in the labour market.
Undeclared labour constitutes a complex phenomenon that has not yet been analyzed within I/O framework. In a unionized duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining context, we reveal the opportunity cost that exists between the taxation and the contributions for social insurance.
In a unionized Cournot duopoly under decentralized wage bargaining regime, we analyzed undeclared labour in a matrix game. We reveal the opportunity cost between taxation and contributions for social insurance that firms and unions face, while we examine all relevant possible unilateral deviations from firms and unions.
Under competing vertical chains, we propose that the downstream mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges is the outcome of independent implicit agreements, between each downstream firm and its exclusive input supplier, in each vertical chain.
The European labour markets are characterized by the existence of trade unions with extensive coverage whereas wage contracts are typically determined through decentralized firm-union bargaining. On the other hand, as it particularly refers to migrant and ethnic minority groups, equally-skilled workers often face lower reservation wages. We argue that these facts may lead unions to opt for discriminatory wage contracts across groups of employees.
The paper investigates whether low skilled male Albanians face unequal treatment in the Greek labour market, two years after the national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment legislation.
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